Conflict of Laws .net

Yesterday, Advocate General Trstenjak delivered her opinion in case C-14/07 (Weiss und Partner).

The background of the case was as follows: The Chamber of Industry and Commerce Berlin (Industrie- und Handelskammer Berlin) sued Nicholas Grimshaw & Partners Ltd. for damages under a architect contract. The parties had agreed in this contract that correspondence was to be conducted in German. The defendant was served with a statement of claim as well as annexes which were drafted in German. After Grimshaw had refused acceptance of the statement of claim and the annexes, Grimshaw was served with an English translation of the statement of claim and annexes written in German without an English translation. Subsequently, Grimshaw referred to Art. 8 (1) Service Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000) and refused to accept the documents due to the fact that the annexes had not been translated into English. After the appeal of Grimshaw against an interim judgment of the Regional Court (Landgericht) Berlin declaring the claim having been served properly was refused by the Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) Berlin, the third party (Weiss and Partner GbR) appealed to the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof).

Since the Bundesgerichtshof had doubts on the interpretation of Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000, it referred the following questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling:

Must Article 8(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (’the Regulation’) be interpreted as meaning that an addressee does not have the right to refuse to accept a document pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Regulation if only the annexes to a document to be served are not in the language of the Member State addressed or in a language of the Member State of transmission which the addressee understands?

If the answer to the first question is in the negative:

Must Article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation be interpreted as meaning that the addressee ‘understands’ the language of a Member State of transmission within the meaning of that regulation because, in the exercise of his business activity, he agreed in a contract with the applicant that correspondence was to be conducted in the language of the Member State of transmission?

If the answer to the second question is in the negative:

Must Article 8(1) of the Regulation be interpreted as meaning that the addressee may not in any event rely on that provision in order to refuse acceptance of such annexes to a document, which are not in the language of the Member State addressed or in a language of the Member State of transmission which the addressee understands, if the addressee concludes a contract in the exercise of his business activity in which he agrees that correspondence is to be conducted in the language of the Member State of transmission and the annexes transmitted concern that correspondence and are written in the agreed language?

Advocate General Trstenjak recommended in her opinion that the ECJ should decide in the following way:

With regard to the first question, the Advocate General suggests that Art. 8 (1) Service Regulation should be interpreted as providing in case of the service of a document including annexes a right of the addressee to refuse acceptance pursuant to Art. 8 (1) Service Regulation also in cases where only the annexes to the document to be served have not been written in the language of the Member State addressed or in a language of the Member State of transmission which the addressee understands.

In respect of the second question, the Advocate General recommends that Art. 8 (1) b) Service Regulation should be construed in this sense that there exists a refutable presumption that the addressee of a document understands the language of a Member State of transmission in terms of this Regulation if he agrees contractually in the exercise of his business activity that correspondence between the contracting parties on the one side and with authorities and public institutions of the Member State of transmission on the other side is conducted in the language of this Member State of transmission. However, since this constitutes only a refutable presumption, the addressee can refute this presumption under the rules of evidence of the Member State where the lawsuit is conducted.

In regard to the third question, the Advocate General submits that Art. 8 (1) Service Regulation should be interpreted as not granting a right to the addressee to refuse the acceptance of annexes to a statement of claim which are not drafted in the language of the Member State addressed, but in the language which has been agreed upon contractually between the parties in the exercise of their business activity for correspondence with authorities and public institutions of the Member State of transmission, if he concludes a contract in excercise of his business activity and agrees that correspondence with authorities and public institutions of the Member State of transmission is conducted in the language of this State and if the transmitted annexes concern this correspondence and are drafted in the agreed language.

(Approximate translation from the German version of the opinion available at the ECJ website.)

See for the full opinion (in German, French, Spanish, Estonian, Dutch, Slovene, Finnish and Swedish) and the reference the website of the ECJ. The referring decision can be found (in German) at the website of the Bundesgerichtshof.

The Supreme Court of Canada has just granted leave to appeal in Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. v. Lombard General Insurance Company of Canada (also indexed as Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Cominco Ltd.), a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (available here).

In British Columbia the insurance companies each sought a declaration that they did not have to defend or indemnify Teck Cominco in respect of environmental damage claims.  Teck Cominco moved to stay those proceedings, primarily on the basis that related litigation was already underway in the State of Washington, USA.  The motion was denied and that decision was upheld on appeal, such that the British Columbia proceedings could proceed.

It is unusual for the Supreme Court of Canada to agree to hear an appeal about the most appropriate forum for the resolution of a dispute.  As is its practice, the court did not provide any reasons for its decision to grant leave.  The court may be wanting to address the role of comity in stay motion cases where there has been a prior positive assertion of jurisdiction by a foreign court. 

As reported in our previous post, the EP’s plenary session adopted today in Brussels, at first reading, a legislative resolution on the Rome I Proposal. While largely based, as regards the conflict rules, on the draft legislative resolution contained in the report voted by the JURI Committee on 21 November 2007, the EP’s final text is the result of some further amendments filed jointly by all the EP political groups before the plenary’s vote.

Three of these last-minute amendments are worth mentioning:

- a new Art. 7 provides a conflict rule on insurance contracts (the issue has been discussed at length in the Council’s Committee on Civil Law Matters: see doc. n. 8935/1/07 of 4 May 2007);

- a third paragraph is added to Art. 9 on overriding mandatory provisions:

Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In considering whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.

- as a result of the introduction of the provision on insurance contracts, Art. 20 on the exclusion of renvoi is redrafted as follows:

The application of the law of any country specified by this Regulation means the application of the rules of law in force in that country other than its rules of private international law, unless provided otherwise in this Regulation.

A provisional edition of the Rome I legislative resolution is available in the collection of the texts adopted by the EP in the session (see p. 73 ff.). Further information will be provided, as soon as the minutes of the sitting are available.

Today, the ECJ delivered its second judgment on the Brussels II bis Regulation (C-68/07, Sundelind Lopez).

The case was referred to the ECJ by the Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen) asking for a preliminary ruling on the following question:

The respondent in a case concerning divorce is neither resident in a Member State nor a citizen of a Member State. May the case be heard by a court in a Member State which does not have jurisdiction under Article 3 [of the Brussels II Regulation], even though a court in another Member State may have jurisdiction by application of one of the rules on jurisdiction set out in Article 3?

The ECJ now held:

Articles 6 and 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2116/2004 of 2 December 2004, as regards treaties with the Holy See, are to be interpreted as meaning that where, in divorce proceedings, a respondent is not habitually resident in a Member State and is not a national of a Member State, the courts of a Member State cannot base their jurisdiction to hear the petition on their national law, if the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction under Article 3 of that regulation.

See for the full judgment the website of the ECJ. See further also our previous post on the reference which can be found here.

In Australia, the applicable law in negligence cases is the law of the place of the tort: Regie National des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491; [2002] HCA 10. On a number of occasions in recent years, Australian courts have dealt with difficult choice of law issues arising out of negligent omissions, asbestos-related injuries and overseas plaintiffs: see, eg, James Hardie Industries v Hall (1998) 43 NSWLR 554; [1998] NSWSC 434; James Hardie Industries v Grigor (1998) 45 NSWLR 20; [1998] NSWSC 266; Amaca Pty Ltd v Frost [2006] NSWCA 173.

In Puttick v Fletcher Challenge Forests Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 264, the Victorian Court of Appeal recently considered the related question of whether Victoria was forum non conveniens for an action in which the Victorian-resident plaintiff sued the New Zealand-incorporated holding company, Fletcher, of his former New Zealand-incorporated employer for negligence in relation to his exposure to asbestos in factories in Belgium and Malaysia which the plaintiff visited at the direction of his employer. At the relevant time, the plaintiff was resident in New Zealand and was employed there.

In accordance with the High Court’s decisions in Zhang and Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; [1990] HCA 55, a stay of proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens would only be granted if Victoria was a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’. This is a more difficult test to satisfy than showing that another forum is a ‘more appropriate forum’: cf Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460. The first instance judge concluded that many witnesses and relevant documents would be located in New Zealand, but that this, of itself, did not mean that Victoria was a clearly inappropriate forum. However, his Honour then concluded that the applicable law was that of New Zealand and that this, taken with the other factors, meant that Victoria was a clearly inappropriate forum. The key issue on appeal was whether New Zealand law applied.

A 2:1 majority of the Court of Appeal (Warren CJ and Chernov JA; Maxwell P dissenting) agreed with the trial judge that New Zealand law did apply and, accordingly, that Victoria was forum non conveniens. The negligence asserted by the plaintiff was that Fletcher: (1) caused or permitted him to be exposed to asbestos in Belgium and Malaysia; (2) failed to provide and maintain a safe system of work for him whilst he was working in Belgium or Malaysia; and (3) failed to warn or instruct him or his employer about the need for protective clothing and equipment whilst working with or exposed to asbestos dust.

The majority considered that each of these acts occurred in New Zealand, there being no act or failure to act in Belgium or Malaysia to which the plaintiff could point which constituted an alleged wrong. Any action which Fletcher should have taken (eg to give further warnings or instructions) would have been taken in New Zealand, and the instructions to visit Belgium and Malaysia were given by the employer and received by the plaintiff in New Zealand.

In contrast, the minority characterised the plaintiff’s complaint as having been exposed to unsafe workplaces in Malaysia and Belgium. Fletcher’s conduct in New Zealand created the risk of harm to the plaintiff, but that risk did not assume significance (i.e. the negligent conduct was not completed) until the plaintiff was exposed, without warning or protection, to asbestos in Malaysia and Belgium.

Both the majority and the minority sought to argue that their respective positions were supported by the cases mentioned above in which Australian courts have previously considered similar issues. Ultimately, cases such as Puttick exemplify the difficulties associated with locating the place of the tort in cases of negligent omission. It remains to be seen whether the plaintiff will seek special leave to appeal this decision to the High Court.

The Section on Private International Law of the French Society of Comparative Legislation has now its own website.

The new site will report on recent developments of comparative conflicts. The editors are French academics and foreign (i.e. non French) correspondants from European civil law jurisdictions. It seems that the French editors will report in French, while the foreign editors may report in English. German professor Jurgen Basedow and German scholar Simon Schwarz have reported several times on German developments in English (see below).

Conflict of laws welcomes this new site dedicated to comparative conflicts!

German professor Jurgen Basedow and German scholar Simon Schwarz have reported in English on the new site of the Section of Private International Law of the Society of Comparative Legislation on a statutory intervention amending the German choice of law rule with regard to name.

The new provision (art. 47 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code - EGBGB) and the report can be found here.

The report of Basedow and Schwarz is here.

In Bid Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Strang and another [2007] SCA 144 (RSA) the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa has ruled on 23 November 2007 that arresting a person in order to found or confirm (civil) jurisdiction is unconstitutional. Under South African law, when a person not domiciled in South Africa is sued in a South African court, the court’s jurisdiction had to be confirmed either by attachment of property or arrest of the person, unless the foreign defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The part of this rule permitting the arrest of a person has now been found to infringe the rights to freedom and security of the person, equality, human dignity, freedom of movement, and possibly also the right to a fair civil trial. It could not be said that the rule provided a justifiable limitation to these fundamental rights. The Court stated that arresting a defendant was a profound infringement and had the effect of coercing him or her to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, to make prompt payment, or to provide security.
The Supreme Court of Appeal abolished the rule and adopted a replacement rule to the effect that where attachment was not possible to found or confirm jurisdiction, the South African courts will have jurisdiction if summons is served on the defendant while he or she is in South Africa and there is sufficient connection between the suit and the area of the court.

Today, the ECJ delivered its first judgment on the Brussels II bis Regulation (C-435/06, Applicant C).

The Finnish Korkein Hallinto-oikeus had referred the following questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling:

1. (a) Does Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, (the Brussels 11a Regulation) apply, in a case such as the present, to the enforcement of a public law decision in connection with child welfare, relating to the immediate taking into custody of a child and his or her placement in a foster family outside the home, taken as a single decision, in its entirety;

(b) or solely to that part of the decision relating to placement outside the home in a foster family, having regard to the provision in Article 1(2)(d) of the regulation;

(c) and, in the latter case, is the Brussels IIa Regulation applicable to a decision on placement contained in one on taking into custody, even if the decision on custody itself, on which the placement decision is dependent, is subject to legislation, based on the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments and administrative decisions, that has been harmonised in cooperation between the Member States concerned?

2. If the answer to Question 1(a) is in the affirmative, is it possible, given that the Regulation takes no account of the legislation harmonised by the Nordic Council on the recognition and enforcement of public law decisions on custody, as described above, but solely of a corresponding private law convention, nevertheless to apply this harmonised legislation based on the direct recognition and enforcement of administrative decisions as a form of cooperation between administrative authorities to the taking into custody of a child?

3. If the answer to Question 1(a) is in the affirmative and that to Question 2 is in the negative, does the Brussels IIa Regulation apply temporally to a case, taking account of Articles 72 and 64(2) of the regulation and the abovementioned harmonised Nordic legislation on public law decisions on custody, if in Sweden the administrative authorities took their decision both on immediate taking into custody and on placement with a family on 23.2.2005 and submitted their decision on immediate custody to the administrative court for confirmation on 25.2.2005, and that court accordingly confirmed the decision on 3.3.2005?

The Court now held with regard to Question 1 (a):

Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2116/2004 of 2 December 2004, is to be interpreted to the effect that a single decision ordering a child to be taken into care and placed outside his original home in a foster family is covered by the term ‘civil matters’ for the purposes of that provision, where that decision was adopted in the context of public law rules relating to child protection.

With regard to the first question, the Court examined first, whether a decision which orders the immediate taking into care of a child relates to parental responsibility (para. 25 et seq.). Here the Court held that the fact that the taking of a child into care is not explicitly listed in Art. 1 (2) of the Regulation cannot lead to the exclusion of these matters from the scope of the Brussels II bis Regulation (para. 28 et seq.). According to the Court, the wording of Art. 1 (2) (”in particular”) shows that the provision has to be understood as a guide and is not exhaustive (para. 30). Further, this point of view is supported inter alia by Recital 5 in the Regulation’s preamble according to which “all decisions on parental responsibility, including measures for the protection of the child” shall be covered (para. 31). Secondly, the Court examined whether a decision ordering the immediate taking into care and placement of a child which was adopted in the context of rules of public law constitutes a “civil matter” in terms of Art. 1 (1) Brussels II bis. In this respect the Court stressed that the term of “civil matters” has to be interpreted in view of the objectives of the Regulation which would be impaired, were decisions to be excluded from the Regulation only because they are governed by public law in some Member States (para. 45). Thus, the term of “civil matters” has to be interpreted autonomously (para. 46).

In respect of Question 2 the Court held:

Regulation No 2201/2003, as amended by Regulation No 2116/2004, is to be interpreted as meaning that harmonised national legislation on the recognition and enforcement of administrative decisions on the taking into care and placement of persons, adopted in the context of Nordic Cooperation, may not be applied to a decision to take a child into care that falls within the scope of that regulation.

Here the Court emphasised that Art. 59 (2) (a) Brussels II bis constitutes the only exception from the general rule of Art. 59 (1) Brussels II bis, according to which the Regulation supersedes conventions concluded between the Member States regarding matters governed by the Regulation and that this exception has to be interpreted strictly (para. 60).

Regarding Question 3 the Court held:

Subject to the factual assessment which is a matter for the national court alone, Regulation No 2201/2003, as amended by Regulation No 2116/2004, is to be interpreted as applying ratione temporis in a case such as that in the main proceedings.

In respect of this last question the Court referred to Art. 64 and Art. 72 Brussel II bis, which show that the Regulation applies in principle only to legal proceedings instituted after its date of application, i.e. 1 March 2005 (para. 68). However, Art. 64 (2) of the Regulation provides that judgments given after the date of application of Brussels II bis in proceedings instituted before that date but after the entry into force of the Brussels II Regulation (Regulation 1347/2000) shall be recognised and enforced in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of Brussels II bis if jurisdiction was founded on rules which accorded with those provided for either in Chapter II or in Brussels II or in a convention concluded between the Member State of origin and the Member State addressed which was in force when the proceedings were instituted. According to the Court, these requirements are, subject to factual assessment which is a matter for the national court, met in the present case (para. 77).

See for the reference, the opinion and the full judgment the website of the ECJ and for the background of the case also our previous post on Advocate General Kokott’ s opinion which can be found here.

Symeon C. Symeonides (Dean, College of Law - Willamette University) has posted Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity (forthcoming on the American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 56, 2008) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This article reviews the European Union’s new Regulation on tort conflicts (”Rome II”), which unifies and “federalizes” the member states’ laws on this subject. The review accepts the drafters’ pragmatic premise that a rule-system built around the lex loci delicti as the basic rule, rather than American-style “approaches,” was the only politically viable vehicle for unification. Within this framework, the review examines whether Rome II provides sufficient and flexible enough exceptions as to make the lex loci rule less arbitrary and the whole system more workable.

The author’s answer is negative. For example, the common-domicile exception is too broad in some respects and too narrow in other respects. Likewise, the “manifestly closer connection” escape is phrased in exclusively geographical terms unrelated to any overarching principle and is worded in an all-or-nothing way that precludes issue-by-issue deployment and prevents it from being useful in all but the easiest of cases. The review concludes that, although attaining a proper equilibrium between legal certainty and flexibility is always difficult, Rome II errs too much on the side of certainty, which ultimately may prove elusive.

On the whole, Rome II is a missed opportunity to take advantage of the rich codification experience and sophistication of modern European conflicts law. Nevertheless, Rome II represents a major political accomplishment in unifying and equalizing the member states’ laws on this difficult subject. If this first step is followed by subsequent improvements, Europe would have achieved in a relatively short time much more than American conflicts law could ever hope for.

An interesting comparison can be made with two previous works by Prof. Symeonides, commenting the Rome II Commission’s Proposal and the EP Rapporteur’s Draft: Tort Conflicts and Rome II: a View from Across (published in the Festschrift für Erik Jayme) and Tort Conflicts and Rome II: Impromptu Notes on the Rapporteur’s Draft. Both are available for download on Diana Wallis’ website (Rome II seminars’ page), together with other works by prominent scholars.

Prof. Symeonides has posted a number of interesting articles on tort conflicts on SSRN (see the complete list of his available works on the author page), among which: The Quest for the Optimum in Resolving Product-Liability Conflicts; Territoriality and Personality in Tort Conflicts; Resolving Punitive-Damages Conflicts.

(Many thanks to Prof. Lawrence B. Solum - Legal Theory Blog - for pointing out Prof. Symeonides’ latest article on Rome II)

In an earlier post we reported on the seminar on Recognition of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings in the US to be held by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) on Monday 26 November 2007. Now the BIICL has made some of the seminar materials available online, with permission from the publication right owners Sweet & Maxwell, Chase Cambria Publishing, Prof Bob Wessels, and Look Chan Ho (Freshfields). The seminar speakers will discuss the latest decisions of the US Bankruptcy Court concerning the interpretation of Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code.
The seminar speakers are:
Professor Bob Wessels, Leiden University
Gabriel Moss QC, 3-4 South Square
Stephen Gale, Herbert Smith
Ron Dekoven, 3-4 South Square

The seminar publications can be downloaded here and are titled as follows:

Professor Bob Wessels, Leiden University

• Twenty suggestions for a makeover of the EU Insolvency Regulation (International Caselaw Alert, No. 12 - V/2006, October 31, 2006, pp. 68-73)

• The quest for coordination of proceedings in crossborder insolvency cases in Europe (Insolvency and Restucturing in Germany - Yearbook 2008, forthcoming)

Gabriel Moss QC, 3-4 South Square

• Mystery of the Sphinx - COMI In The US

• Beyond the Sphinx - Is Chapter 15 The Sole Gateway

• Death of the Sphinx (First printed in volume 20, pp. 4, 56, and 157 respectively, of Insolvency Intelligence, published by Sweet & Maxwell)

Ron Dekoven, 3-4 South Square

• US Chapter 15 Application Refused (First printed in issue 5, volume 4 of International Corporate Rescue, published by Chase Cambria Publishing)

Look Chan Ho, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

• Proving COMI: Seeking recognition under chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code

More information on the seminar is available at the BIICL´s seminar website.

The EP’s Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) adopted in its meeting of 20 November 2007 a Draft Legislative Resolution on the Rome I Proposal on the law applicable to contractual obligations, on the basis of a new set of 62 “final” compromise amendments presented by the rapporteur, Ian Dumitrescu.

According to the Rome I page of Diana Wallis’ website (who acts as an EP shadow rapporteur in the Rome I codecision procedure, after her successful work on Rome II Regulation), the final amendments, which modify a substantial part of the recitals and provisions of the Regulation, have been drafted by the rapporteur following a series of informal trialogues with the Council Presidency and the Commission (thus adopting a different approach from the one taken in the Rome II procedure, in which an agreement could be found by the institutions only in the last-resort Conciliation Committee).

The vote on the Draft Legislative Resolution at first reading by the Parliament’s plenary session is scheduled on 29 November 2007. According to the Rome I OEIL page, the text will be then examined by the Council in its meeting of 6 December 2007: given the agreement reached in the trialogues, it is entirely possible that the text will gain at least political agreement in the Council, thus making the adoption of the act far more imminent than previously expected (see Council’s document no. 15325/07 of 19 November 2007 - currently not accessible, whose title reads “Approval of the final compromise package with a view to a first reading agreement with the European Parliament”).

Further information on the evolution of the codecision procedure will be posted as soon as it is available.

The secure, Amazon-powered CONFLICT OF LAWS .NET online bookshop has been updated and expanded, and now provides details and purchase options for most private international law books (written in English) currently available.

Any revenue from it goes towards the cost of running the website, so you are actively supporting CONFLICT OF LAWS .NET by using this bookshop, but note that the amount that you pay does not differ from the amount you would pay on the Amazon website direct.

Any suggestions for improvement, or any books that you would like to see available (including your own), are very welcome - send me an email.

On 27 November 2007 the International Max Planck Research School (IMPRS) for Maritime Affairs together with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) will host, within their lecture series titled “The Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs”, an evening lecture by Prof. Sergio Carbone (Professor, University of Genoa) titled “Liability from marine pollution between uniform law and choice of law and jurisdiction”. The program can be found here.

Sarah Prager (1 Chancery Lane) has written a piece in the Journal of Personal Injury Law on “The applicable law in cases involving the loi badinter: sections 11 and 12 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 reviewed” (J.P.I. Law 2007, 4, 338-344). Here’s the abstract:

Discusses, with reference to salient case law, questions over the applicability of UK law in foreign jurisdictions. Outlines the relevant legal framework for accidents abroad under the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 s.11 and s.12. Focuses on the Lincoln County Court decision in Prince v Prince concerning the issue of jurisdiction for two British nationals involved in a road traffic accident whilst in France, highlighting the reluctance of the courts to displace the presumption of jurisdiction contained in s.11.

Available to J.P.I. Law subscribers.

The latest issue of the French Revue Critique de Droit International Privé has been released. In addition to 9 comments of French and European cases, it contains two articles. The table of contents can be found here.

The first article is authored by Dr. A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, who teaches in Lausanne, Marseille and Palermo. It deals with Muslim Family and Inheritance Law in Swizterland (Droit musulman de la famille et des successions en Suisse). The English abstract reads:

The fundamental opposition between Coranic family law and the Swiss legal order concerns, on the one hand, the very conception of law, here the work of God, there the work of man, and on the other hand, the divisions of society, which on the one hand follow religious obedience, and on the other, territoriality or nationality. The resulting antagonisms are of daily and practical import, since they affect marriage, parent-child relationship or succession. They will find a solution only if, within the Arab world, sources of religious law are confined to the Coran, and indeed if social governance leaves room for reason, and, in the western world, if the concept of revelation reinvests its reason-liberating dynamic, and if there is a firm reaction to all violations of the principle of secularity and non-discrimination on the basis of race or religion.

The second article is authored by Professor Hélène Chanteloup, who lectures at Amiens University. It addresses the issue of National Laws Being Taken into Account by EC Courts (La prise en consideration du droit national par le juge communautaire. Contribution à la comparaison des méthodes et solutions du droit communautaire et du droit international privé). The English abstract reads:

Far from the difficulties raised by the question of the right and duty of national courts when foreign law is applicable, the question of the status of the national laws pleaded in European litigations seems to be sobed with coherence and a relative simplicity. Except the specific case of the arbitration clause (art. 238 CE), the national law cannot be applied by European judges. It is just taken into account like any other factual element of the situation. National law is treated as a question of fact. Therefore, it is not to be imputed to European judges and has to be proved by the party with evidence of all kinds. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has always considered that this question of proof has to be solved in respect of the interests of the European law which contributes to the coherence and the stability of the procedural treatment of national law.

Articles of the Revue Critique cannot be downloaded.

As we announced in the last posting concerning the CLIP group, they are preparing an international conference on issues arising where in the intersection of intellectual property law and private international law. The conference program includes the following topics and speakers:

Are there any Common European Principles of a Private International Law with regard
to Intellectual Property?
Prof. Dr. Annette Kur, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property Law, Munich

The ALI Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Judgments in
Transnational Intellectual Property Disputes
Prof. Dr. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, New York University

“Contracts Relating to Intellectual or Industrial Property Rights” under the Rome I
Proposal
Prof. Dr. Matthias Leistner, University of Bonn

The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations Arising from an Infringement of
Registered IP Rights
Prof. Dr. Peter Mankowski, University of Hamburg

The Law Applicable to Infringements of Non-Registered IP Rights
Prof. Dr. Haimo Schack, University of Kiel

Extraterritorial Application of IP Law - An American View
Prof. Dr. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Chicago-Kent College of Law

The Private International Law of IP and of Unfair Commercial Practices: Coherence or
Divergence?
Prof. Dr. Pedro Miguel de Asensio, University Complutense of Madrid

Cross Border IP Litigation – Still an Issue under the Brussels I Regulation?
Prof. Dr. Paul Torremans, University of Nottingham/University of Ghent

A Spider without a Web? Multiple Defendants in IP Litigation
Prof. Dr. Marcus Norrgård, Swedish School of Economics and Business
Administration, Helsinki

The Future of Centralised Patent Litigation in Europe – Between EPLA and the
Community Patent Regulation
Dr. Stefan Luginbühl, European Patent Office

Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning IP Infringements on the Internet
Dr. Axel Metzger, Max-Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private
Law, Hamburg

The opening speach on behalf of the DFG Graduate School n. 1148 “Intellectual Property and the Public Domain”, University of Bayreuth belongs to Prof. Dr. Diethelm Klippel, and the introduction into the conference has been entrusted to Prof. Dr. Stefan Leible and Prof. Dr. Ansgar Ohly of the University of Bayreuth. The conference will take place in Bayreuth, Germany on 4 and 5 April 2008.

The detailed program of the conference can be downloaded here.

An interesting article commenting some significant changes in the French rules on recognition of foreign judgments, as established by recent case law of the French Cour de Cassation, has been published in the latest issue of the International and Comparative Law Quarterly (no. 4/2007: see our post here).

The note has been written by Gilles Cuniberti (University of Paris Val-de-Marne), editor of conflictoflaws.net for France, who has extensively reported on these landmark judgments for our site (see his posts on the Prieur, Avianca and Fountaine Pajot cases).

An abstract of the article (”The Liberalization of the French Law of Foreign Judgments”, 56 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 931 (2007)) has been kindly provided by the author:

The French highest court for private matters (the Cour de Cassation) has significantly liberalized the French law of foreign judgments between 2006 and 2007. In Prieur, it overruled a century-old precedent which had interpreted Article 15 of the Civil Code as preventing the recognition of foreign judgments when the defendant was a French citizen. In Avianca, it partly overruled a 45-year-old precedent which prohibited the recognition of foreign judgments which had not applied the law applicable pursuant to the French choice-of-law rule.

The note presents this evolution and discusses its implications.

The full article is available for download to ICLQ and Westlaw subscribers. Highly recommended.

The text of the judgments of the Cour de Cassation is available at the following links: Prieur, Avianca, Fountaine Pajot.

The fourth issue 2007 of the ICLQ (Volume 56, Number 4, October 2007) has been recently published. The full TOC is available here. Contents dealing with PIL include:

• TD Grant, International Arbitration and English Courts:

The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, Longmore LJ, on 24 January 2007 handed down a decision in Fiona Trust v Privalov which clarifies the relation between sections 9 and 72 of the Arbitration Act 1996; affirms, again, in strong terms the separability (or severability) of an arbitration clause from the contract in which it is included; and, apparently for the first time in English courts, establishes that allegations of bribery may be subject to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator. The decision therefore holds interest in relation to the enforcement in the United Kingdom of agreements to arbitrate and, more generally, supports the position that arbitration has a role to play in international efforts to combat corruption.

• Gilles Cuniberti, The Liberalization of the French Law of Foreign Judgments (see our dedicated post here);
• Andrea Schulz, The Accession of the European Community to the Hague Conference on Private International Law.

The articles are available for download to ICLQ and Westlaw subscribers.

Richard Oppong (Lancaster Law School) has written an article on “Private International Law in Africa: Past, Present and Future” in the latest issue of the American Journal of Comparative Law ((2007) 55 AJCL 677-719.) Here’s the abstract:

The development of private international law has stagnated in Africa for some time now. This is reflected in the neglected and undeveloped state of the subject, and the near absence of Africa in international processes, academic forums, writings, and institutions that have significance for the subject. This article explores the present and future state of the subject in Africa by situating it in a historical context. It challenges the often unarticulated assumption of writers on private international law in Africa that the subject and issues it addresses came to Africa only after the advent of colonization. It suggests that although the specific rules may be difficult to ascertain, conflict of laws problems existed in pre-colonial Africa and were, consistent with current theories on pre-modern societies, addressed by a mixture of practices and mechanisms that tended towards conflicts avoidance and lex forism. It notes that during the colonial period the subject developed without any clear theoretical underpinnings, was deployed to fulfil narrow political and commercial goals, and was largely insulated from international developments. The article argues that a new dawn is rising in which the subject will occupy a prominent place with regard to many issues in Africa. It examines how an emerging academic interest in the subject, current economic integration initiatives, harmonization of laws, drive to promote trade and investment, constitutionalism and human rights, and other developments will impact private international law in Africa.

Available to AJCL subscribers.

Simon Schwarz (Hamburg) has published a comprehensive article on “The Law Applicable to Voluntary Agency in a Comparative Perspective” (“Das Internationale Stellvertretungsrecht im Spiegel nationaler und supranationaler Kodifikationen”) in the latest issue of the “Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht” (RabelsZ 71 (2007) pp. 729-801).

Here is the English summary:

Questions relating to an agent’s authority represent a basic problem of contract law and are of considerable practical importance in international market transactions. The article analyses which law should govern the powers of an agent to bind his principal vis-à-vis a third party. To this end, the article examines, systemises, and evaluates the pertinent solutions adopted in more than twenty jurisdictions as well as in the European Commission’s Proposal for a Rome I-Regulation of December 2005. The findings may be summarised as follows:

1. Due to the characteristic triangular relationship of the agency situation there is a clear need for a separate conflicts rule dealing with the agent’s authority.

2. The agent’s place of business and the place where the agent acted represent the most commonly accepted and best founded connecting factors in this respect while the place of the habitual residence of the agent should not be taken into account. As to the question which law should prevail if the agent actually does not act in the country of his business establishment, the solutions differ considerably among the various legal systems. Basically, applying the law of the place of business of a professional agent constitutes a sound and sensible solution which particularly meets the needs of international trade. Therefore, this connecting factor should generally take precedence over the lex loci actus provided that the agent’s place of business was actually foreseeable to the third party.

3. Most of the legal systems recognise party autonomy with regard to the law governing the agent’s authority, which appears to be a particularly reasonable concept. As to its implementation, however, there are some variations in detail. Both as a matter of principle and of business practice the most appropriate approach seems to be to allow the principal to designate the law applicable to the agent’s powers unilaterally, i.e., without the consent of the agent or the third party, provided that this designation is in writing and is foreseeable to the third party. Since the ambit of the law chosen by the principal also extends the possible liability of the agent as falsus procurator the choice must be foreseeable to the agent as well.

4. The scope of the conflict rule on agency should be designed comprehensively rather than restrictively in order to avoid difficult problems of characterisation. Hence, the rule should not merely adjudicate the existence and the extend of the agent’s actual or apparent authority but should encompass the legal consequences of the exercise of the agent’s powers with regard the principal/third party relation as well as the agent/third party relation, including the liability of the falsus procurator and the effects of an undisclosed agency.

You are a French couple and you cannot have a baby? One option is to fly to San Diego and to find a surrogate mother. Now, you should really want it, because 1) California is almost on the other side of the world, 2) it can get pretty warm out there, especially when half of the state is burning and 3) French authorities will give you a really hard time when you will come back.

The French press reports this week-end on how French authorities have been doing everything they could to prevent a French couple who resorted to a Californian surrogate mother from gaining recognition in France of their parental status. The Paris Court of appeal has just ruled in their favour, but I could not see the decision. The article of Liberation can be found here (in French).

Californian dream

Meet Dominique and Sylvie. In 1998, they learned that they could not have a baby, as Sylvie discovered she had no uterus. They did not want to adopt, but knew that surrogacy was legal in California (Liberation reports that they understood that it was even viewed with favor). They flew there, found a francophile surrogate mother, Mary. Eventually, two girls were born on October 25, 2000. Dominique and Sylvie say that their experience was great. Californian authorities delivered a birth certificate providing that they were the parents. Time to go back home.

Problems began on American soil. Dominique and Sylvie sought to establish a French passport for the children. At the French consulate, they were told that it would not be easy. Several comparable requests were on hold. A French officer told them off the record that the best was probably to get a U.S. passport. They got one easily, and “with big smiles” (i.e. the Americans were happy to deliver the passport).

Welcome back

But that was only the beginning. French consular authorities had liaised with French prosecutors. Upon arrival in France, the couple was investigated by the French police, who searched their home, their offices, even her doctor’s office. In 2001, they were charged with a variety of French criminal offences, including attempt to fraud civil registries (because they wanted to have the children registered in France as theirs, i.e. have the American birth certificate recognized in France) and facilitating the dealing of children between a parent willing to adopt and a parent willing to abandon his/her child. In 2004, a French investigating judge dismissed the charges on the ground that French criminal law did not apply to acts which took place abroad, in a jurisdiction where they were legal.

In the meantime, prosecutors had also initiated civil proceedings. The point was to set aside the transcription on the French registries of the parental relationship, and get a judicial declaration that Dominique and Sylvie were not the parents of the children. The Paris court of appeal has just dismissed the proceedings a few days ago. Although I could not read the decision, I understand that it rules that the children should be considered for all purposes as the daughters of the couple.

Recognition of foreign birth certificates

From the perspective of the conflict of laws, the case raises the very interesting issue of the recognition of foreign birth certificates. These are typically not judicial decisions, and I guess that Californian ones are not either. The issue is therefore whether to apply the law of foreign judgments to them, or at least similar rules. Under French law, the answer is clearly that you should apply similar rules. However, there are very few precedents, and French writers do not agree on the requirements that foreign public acts ought to meet to be recognized in France. Yet, most of them would agree on the three following propositions:

1) the foreign public act may not be reviewed on the merits,

2) however, it should not be contrary to public policy (i.e. its solution should not be shocking from a French perspective),

3) there should be no fraude à la loi (i.e. it should not have been obtained for the sole purpose of avoiding the application of French law).

In the present case, two arguments could be made against the recognition of the Californian certificate. First, even though the certificate was not to be reviewed on the merits, it could have been argued that it was contrary to French public policy. The issue here was how badly surrogacy is perceived in France. Is it only a remarkable foreign practice, or is it a practice which is repugnant to the French society? The story of Dominique and Sylvie made the front page of Liberation, with the following headline: Ca vient (”It is coming”). The French law prohibiting surrogacy dates back to 1994, but is meant to be revised in 2009, and it is Liberation’s hope that the ban will end then (See the editorial here). It may be, then, that the French society has reached the point where, although it is not a legal practice yet, it is not anymore contrary to French public policy.

However, the second argument which could be made was much stronger. It seems that the French couple had indeed flown to San Diego for the sole purpose of avoiding the French ban. The practice remains illegal in France. Going abroad for no other reason than obtaining the application of another law is a fraude à la loi. It will be interesting to see how the court responded to that argument, if the argument was put forward at all.

According to a statement by the Portuguese Presidency, and a press release by the European Commission (DG Freedom, Security and Justice), the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters was signed by the EC, Denmark and the three EFTA States which are party to the old Lugano Convention (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) in a ceremony held on 30 October 2007 in Lugano. The text was signed on behalf of the European Community by Alberto Costa, Portuguese Minister of Justice.

On the negotiating process of the convention, and the Council’s decision on its signing on behalf of the Community, see our previous posts here and here. The text of the new convention is attached to the Council’s decision: pursuant to Art. 300(2) of the EC Treaty, it is subject to its possible conclusion, by another Council’s decision, at a later date.

According to Art. 73 of the convention, the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Swiss Federal Council, which shall act as Depositary. The convention will enter into force on the first day of the sixth month following the date on which the European Community and a Member of the European Free Trade Association deposit their instruments of ratification.

On the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice for the interpretation of the provisions of the convention, which becomes part of Community rules, see Protocol no. 2 annexed to the convention, which sets up also a system of exchange of information similar to the one adopted for the 1988 Lugano convention. See also the Swiss Federal Council’s website for the annual reports on national case law relating to the old Lugano convention.

The British Institute of International and Comparative Law holds on Monday 26 November 2007, 17:30 to 19:30 a seminar on Recognition of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings in the US. This seminar is part of the British Institute’s 2007-2008 Seminar Series on Private International Law. For further information, have a look at the Institute´s seminar website.

Chris Clarkson (Leicester) and Elizabeth Cooke (Reading) have written a short article in the new issue of Family Law entitled, “Matrimonial Property: Harmony in Europe?” (Fam. Law 2007, 37(Oct), 920-923.)

Here’s the abstract:

This article assesses the potential impact on the divorce of married couples of the introduction of uniform choice of law and mutual recognition rules throughout the EU in disputes concerning matrimonial property, as envisaged by the EU Green Paper on conflict of laws in matters concerning matrimonial property regimes, including the question of jurisdiction and mutual recognition (COM (2006) 400 final). It considers the advantages and disadvantages of the UK opting into such a proposal.

There is also a short casenote in the same issue by Gillian Douglas, that discusses the Family Division decision in Re N (Jurisdiction) [2007] EWHC 1274 on whether the courts in France or in Wales had jurisdiction to hear divorce proceedings between British spouses, where the wife returned to Wales after the marriage broke down, the husband remaining in France, and both filed petitions in their countries of residence. It comments on the test for domicile of choice.

See all of our posts relating to private international family law here.