Conflict of Laws .net

Yasmine Lahlou & Marina Matousekova have written an article in the latest issue of the International Business Law Journal on "Private International Law Applied to Business" (No.4, 2006, p.547-573). The abstract states:

In the field of conflicts of laws, French courts were referred disputes relating to employment and factoring agreements. The issues of procedural agreements and court’s duty in applying foreign laws were dealt with, as well as the impact of public policy rules on insurance contracts. French courts also ruled on the issue of court’s jurisdiction as regards agency agreements and insolvency proceedings as well as on States’ jurisdictional immunities.

In community law, the ECJ and French courts ruled on the notion of the « centre of a debtor’s main interests » in the sense of Article 3.1 of the EC Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings as well as on problems of transmission of acts between Member States (EC Regulation 1348/2000). The ECJ also ruled on the res judicata of a decision having infringed community law. English courts ruled on an anti suit injunction in regard of the violation of an arbitration agreement and on jurisdictional immunities. French and Irish courts ruled, on the ground of Article 5.1 of the Brussels Convention, on the issue of courts’ jurisdiction in the field of brokerage contracts and sale of goods. The French Cour de cassation, the ECJ and the English High Court ruled, on the ground of Article 5.3 of the Brussels Convention, on territorial jurisdiction in the field of intellectual property rights, damages caused by car accidents, and misleading declarations. The ECJ was also interrogated as to the application of Article 16.1 of the Convention to damages to real estates, while the Cour de cassation was asked to rule upon the application of Article 16.4 of the Convention to registered intellectual property rights. The Cour de cassation also had to rule, on the ground of Article 6.1 of EC Regulation, on the link of connexity between main claims and claims in guarantee. The English High court was referred an issue of lis pendens with regard to the date of accession of a State to EC Regulation 44/2001. The Cour de cassation also ruled, on the ground of Article 27.1 of the Brussels Convention, on lis pendens in an action for infringement of intellectual property rights. In the field of recognition and enforcement, French, English and Italian courts ruled, on the ground of Article 27 of the Brussels Convention, on possible breaches of rules of public policy, on the regularity of a notification to the defendants, and on the purported contradiction between national and foreign decisions. The ECJ ruled, on the ground of Articles 34 and 36 of the Convention, on the consequences of an irregularity of the notification of the foreign decision with regard to its exequatur. The French Cour de cassation and the Paris Court of Appeal ruled on the enforceability of foreign judgments in the sense of Article 47.1 of the Convention.

As regard to private international law in the US, the District Court of New York recalled the criteria for American courts to have jurisdiction over class action in securities fraud claims, while the US Court of Appeals of the First Circuit ruled on the extra-territoriality of the Whistleblower provision of the Sarbanes Oxley Act.

Those with access to the IBLJ can download the article, or you can buy the article for 47 Euros from the IBLJ website.

Ettore Consalvi (University of Rome) has published an article in the latest issue of International Insolvency Review on "The regime for circulation of judgements under the EC regulation on insolvency proceedings" (Vol. 15, Issue 3, 2006, p. 147-162). Here's the abstract:

The regime for recognition and enforcement of judgements under the EC Regulation 1346/00 on insolvency proceedings raises several issues due to gaps in its provisions (Chapter II). This article analyses these rules and suggests solutions to its principal shortcomings particularly focusing on the prohibition against reviewing decisions as to their merits and conflicts between judgements opening main insolvency proceedings in different member states. This analysis draws on the European Court of Justice's interpretation of the 1968 Brussels Convention in preliminary rulings, which is a valuable tool for dealing with problems concerning recognition and enforcement of judgements as the Regulation is based on a similar framework.

The full article is available on the International Insolvency Review website.

There are two articles in the new issue of Abitration International that deal with private international law issues arising out of international commercial arbitration. They are:

Thomas Buergenthal, “The proliferation of disputes, dispute settlement procedures and respect for the rule of law” Arbitration Int. 2006, 22(4), 495-499. Abstract:

Considers the reasons for the proliferation of disputes, particularly international disputes, and of dispute resolution mechanisms. Discusses whether respect for the rule of law has kept pace with these trends, especially with regard to conflict of laws issues and the selection of arbitrators and judges.

Klaus Peter Berger, “Evidentiary privileges: best practice standards versus/and arbitral discretion” Arbitration Int. 2006, 22(4), 501-520. Abstract:

Examines the diverse approaches to evidentiary privileges in international commercial arbitration that are taken in various jurisdictions, and considers conflict of laws issues in this area. Assesses whether there is a need for harmonised best practice standards or whether the resolution of privilege rule conflicts can be left to arbitral discretion.

Those with a subscription to Arbitration International can access the full articles online.

Again with thanks to the International Civil Litigation Blog for many of the citations below, Part II of the December 2006 round-up will discuss a few significant case developments in the fields of International Discovery and Foreign Sovereign Immunity.  More expanded discussion of these cases, and a few others pertaining to these topics, can be found at that site and other sites linked below.

INTERNATIONAL DISCOVERY

Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 2006 WL 3422227 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2006).

In this case, a number of Israeli and American individuals and estates pressed actions against Arab Bank for aiding and abetting murder, conspiracy to commit murder, provision of material support to terrorists, committing and financing terrorism and other related claims.  Arab Bank claimed that bank secrecy laws in Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Monetary Authority (recognized by the United States) prevent the disclosure of certain records. At issue here is whether foreign bank secrecy laws can shield Arab Bank’s records from discovery. Violations of these laws involve criminal penalties of fines and incarceration, and plaintiffs apparently conceded that some of the information they sought in discovery would require violating the secrecy laws.

Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the U.S. interests in combating terrorism trumped a foreign state’s interest in bank secrecy, holding that:

“there is no question that important interests of the United States would be undermined by noncompliance with the discovery orders issued by the court. As the court has already recognized, those interests are articulated in statutes on which some of the claims in this litigation rest: “Congress has expressly made criminal the providing of financial and other services to terrorist organizations and expressly created a civil tort remedy for American victims of international terrorism.” Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F.Supp.2d 571, 584 (E.D.N.Y.2005). The discovery sought here is transactional and other evidence of precisely those financial and other services at which the statutes here are aimed. Without that discovery, the interests expressed in those statutes will be difficult if not impossible to vindicate in this action.”

According to the court, although maintaining bank secrecy is an important interest of the foreign jurisdictions where the discovery sought here resides, that interest must yield to the interests of combating terrorism and compensating its victims. As members of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, both Jordan and Lebanon have expressly adopted a policy not to rely on bank secrecy laws as a basis for protecting information relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. Although the Palestinian Monetary Authority has apparently not expressly adopted any policies recognizing the subordination of bank secrecy to the interest of fighting terrorism, it is not a state, and its interests therefore need not be accorded the same level of deference accorded to “states” in considering comity. In any event, as the Palestinian Monetary Authority operates in an area governed at least in part by other authorities that have themselves engaged in terrorist activity, it would be absurd for this court to exalt the bank secrecy interests of those under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Monetary Authority over the anti-terrorism interests of the United States and other recognized states in the region.The court ultimately concluded that Arab Bank should, with this opinion in hand, seek permission from appropriate governments to disclose information. The court deferred further action pending the outcome of this process.  News source and blog discussions of this case can be found here and here.

SEC v. Sandifur, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89428 (W.D. Wash. 2006)

This case involves an action against Defendants for securities fraud. A witness who is a United States citizen working in Luxembourg has declined Defendant’s request to voluntarily appear in the United States for a deposition. The Walsh Act however, provides a U.S. Court with subpoena power over a national or resident of the United States who is in a foreign country if “it is not possible to obtain [a witness’s] testimony in admissible form without his personal appearance.” 28 U.S.C. §  1783(a). The issue presented here is whether the party seeking that subpoena power should be required to resort to the procedures outlined in the Hague Evidence Convention as a “possible” means of obtaining the testimony without a Walsh Act subpoena.  The court noted that:

“Under the Walsh Act, subpoenas may be issued when it is “impractical” to obtain the information. . . . Impracticality occurs, for example, where resort to alternative methods is unlikely to produce the relevant evidence in time to meet impending discovery deadlines. The court held that “[u]se of the Hague Convention procedures in this case would be impractical. . . . [T]he discovery deadline of February 17, 2007 is only a few months away. Though the Parties disagree on precisely how long the Hague Convention procedures generally take to process letters of request, . . . it can take up to a year, and that at the end of the process the government of Luxembourg may exercise its right Under Article 23 of the Hague Convention not to grant such a request.  [T]he issue here is not that the Hague Convention procedures are merely inconvenient because they would require more resources or expertise to implement, but rather that they are impractical in the context the looming discovery deadline and overall trial schedule. [T]he Walsh Act does not require a harsh rule of 20/20 hindsight to see whether it ever would have been possible to obtain the information via other means but rather whether, looking forward, it “is not possible to obtain [the] testimony in admissible form without [the witness’s] personal appearance.” 28 U.S.C. §  1783(a) (emphasis added). While a party’s unreasonable delay may factor into the “interests of justice” analysis, the Act thus does not require denial of a subpoena where the alternative means would once have been theoretically feasible.”

Accordingly, the court held that “Defendants demonstrated that it is not possible to obtain [the requested] testimony in admissible form without his personal appearance and have thus satisfied both requirements to obtain a Walsh Act subpoena.”  The subpoena was accordingly granted.

Finally, the court discussed where the deposition should occur. The court considered London, but decided that this alternative would infringe upon the sovereignty of the UK. Forcing the foreign party to fly to New York seemed an excessive burden to the party and the court. Therefore, the court held that the deposition should proceed in Luxembourg. As for the infringement on Luxembourg’s sovereignty:Any potential infringement on Luxembourg’s sovereignty is outweighed by the imposition that the alternatives would impose on the nonparty witness. The Supreme Court has held that “American courts are not required to adhere blindly to the directives” of countries who oppose unauthorized, American-style discovery even when they have gone so far as to enact “blocking statutes.” Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n. 29 (1987); see also Valois of America Inc. v. Ridson Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344; Rich v. KIS California, Inc, 121 F.R.D 254, 258 (M.D.N.C. 1998). While this Court recognizes that the “interest of foreign nations in the sanctity and respect of their laws is both important and deserving of significant respect,” see In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2000), in this case any potential sovereignty concerns are outweighed by the countervailing considerations regarding the significant burden that would otherwise be imposed on a nonparty witness. This decision, particularly that the Hague Evidence Convention is an “impractical” process, seems to further weaken the strength of that Convention in U.S. Courts.

In re Application of Roz Trading Ltd., 2006 WL 3741078 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2006)

Roz Trading, the Coca-Cola Export Company (”CCEC”), and the government of Uzbekistan entered a contract for a joint venture. Roz Trading alleges that Uzbekistan and CCEC seized its interest in the venture and accordingly brought its claim before the International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber in Vienna (the “Centre”) in accordance with the contractual arbitration clause. Roz Trading sought the assistance of the court to obtain discovery from the Coca-Cola Company to be used in the arbitration.
 

Roz Trading relied upon 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) in requesting judicial assistance for document discovery. The court addressed whether section 1782(a) includes arbitrations before the Centre, a private arbitral forum.  The Coca-Cola Company argued that the Centre is not a “tribunal” for purposes of §1782(a) because it is a private institution whose proceedings are voluntary and arbitral. Taking guidance from Intel v. AMD, 542 U.S. 241 (2004), wherein the Supreme Court determined that the Directorate-General of Competition for the Commission of the European Communities was a “tribunal,” the court here held that private arbitral panels are also “tribunals” for 1782(a) purposes. In Intel, the Supreme Court drew special attention to the 1964 amendment to 1782(a) which “deleted the words ‘in any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country,’ and replaced them with the phrase ‘in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,’” and characterized §1728(a) tribunals as “first-instance decisionmaker[s], capable of rendering a decision on the merits, and as part of the process that could ultimately lead to final resolution of the dispute.” Here, the Centre performs just such a function.  Accordingly, “[t]he Court held that the Centre is a ‘foreign or international tribunal’ within the meaning of § 1782(a).” In so holding, the court expressly disagreed with both the Second and the Fifth Circuits which, prior to Intel v. AMD, held that only governmental bodies qualify as tribunals under 1782(a). See Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184 (2d. Cir.1999) and Republic of Kazahkstan v. Beidermann, 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir.1999).

As a question of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the court issued an opinion fully supportive of international arbitration and robust judicial assistance for such forums. This opinion also fulfills the prediction of some commentators that Intel v. AMD would cause some courts to revisit whether private arbitration constitutes a tribunal under §1782.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, No. 05-85 (U.S. 2006)

In a possible watershed case regarding the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, the Supreme Court has now twice re-listed the cert. petition in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, 05-85, thereby pushing back its grant or denial of Certiorari until after its holiday break.  The Questions Presented by the Petition are:

1. Whether an entity that is wholly and beneficially owned by a foreign state’s instrumentality, and whose sole purpose is to perform international treaty and trade agreement obligations for the benefit of the foreign state’s citizens, may nonetheless be denied status as an “organ of a foreign state” under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2), based on an analysis of sovereignty that ignores the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation, conduct, and operations on behalf of its government.

2. Whether an entity is an “organ of a foreign state” under the FSIA when its shares are completely owned by a governmental corporation that, by statute, performs all of its acts as the agent of the foreign sovereign.

The cases grew out of the energy crisis in California in 2000 and 2001. Powerex contends that it is an arm of the province of British Columbia in Canada, but the NInth Circuit Court rejected that argument.  The full Petition is available courtesy of SCOTUS Bloghere. The SG has recommended that the Court grant on the first question. The decision of the Ninth circuit opinion is available here.

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Federation, 2006 WL 3476236 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2006)

This is fascinating case blending history and international law.  It involves the proper possession of the historic collection of books and materials of the Agudas Chasidei Chabad (“Chabad”), an organization of Jewish religious communities located worldwide with origins in the Russian Empire. The organization’s complaint against the Russian Federation and several Russian state agencies alleges that the defendants illegally took and retained a library and archive of Jewish religious books and manuscripts after World War II, which Chabad claims to rightfully own. On a motion to dismiss, the court heard: (1) Whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act precludes jurisdiction over the case in US federal court; (2) Whether the act of state doctrine, which instructs US courts to presume the validity of actions taken by foreign governments within their territories, should preclude the court from ruling on the plaintiffs’ claims; (3) Whether forum non conveniens should compel dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act embodies the longstanding tradition of foreign sovereign immunity, but the Act includes a series of exceptions, one of which, the expropriation exception, the court found applicable to this case. For the exception to apply, the court needed to find that (1) property rights are at issue; (2) the property was taken in violation of international law; and (3) the property is owned or operated “by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality’ engages in commercial activity in the United States.” The court granted the motion to dismiss regarding the library of works. Discussing the second prong, it concluded that the alleged taking of the property took place in the early 1920s, when the Fifth and Sixth Rebbes of the Chabad were citizens of the Soviet Union. In order for a taking to violate international law, the court reasoned, it must involve a state taking the property of citizens of a foreign state, and that condition was not satisfied in this case. Regarding the archives, however, the court found that the complaint alleged a violation of international law. Specifically, the archival materials were seized by the Nazis during WWII and, at the end of the war, they were appropriated by the Soviet Red Army in Poland in 1945. By the time the property taking occurred, the sixth Rebbe had become a Latvian citizen and the Chabad had been formally constituted as a New York Corporation, satisfying the requirement that the taking be conducted by a state actor against citizens of a foreign state.  The court also found the first and third prongs easily met with regard to the archives.

The court then found the Act of State doctrine inapplicable to this case because the taking in question did not occur within Soviet territory. While “[t]he act of state doctrine directs courts in the United States to presume the validity of ‘acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions,’” neither the initial seizure of the library by the Nazis nor the subsequent appropriation of the library by the Soviet Union took place in Soviet territory. Consequently, the court held the act of state doctrine to be inapplicable to this case.

Finally, the court rejected the invitation to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, finding that the defendants had failed to satisfy their burden to demonstrate the existence of a viable alternative forum. Additionally, the court found that the costs of hearing the case in the United States, including the expenses of document translation and the difficulty of accessing evidence currently located within the Russian Federation, did not justify moving the case to an alternative forum. Finally, the court noted strong public interest factors in resolving the dispute in the plaintiff’s chosen forum, including the DC Circuit’s location in the nation’s diplomatic and political epicenter, the longstanding interest that the United States government has taken in the dispute, and the lack of regard that the Russian government has shown in allowing the archives to fall into disrepair. These factors, taken together, led the court to find that the defendants had failed to overcome the strong presumption in favor of the plaintiffs’ chosen forum.

Some news discussions of this case can be found here.  Opinio juris has this commentary.

On 14 December 2006, the European Court of Justice handed down a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 34(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.

Art 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, it will be remembered, provides that a judgment is not to be recognised ‘where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so’. In ASML (C-283/05), after litigation in the German courts, the reference was made in the course of proceedings between ASML Netherlands BV (‘ASML’), a company established in Veldhoven (Netherlands), and Semiconductor Industry Services GmbH (‘SEMIS’), a company established in Feistritz-Drau (Austria), concerning the enforcement in Austria of a judgment given in default of appearance by the Rechtbank ’s-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands) ordering SEMIS to pay ASML the sum of EUR 219 918.60 together with interest and the costs of the proceedings. The question essentially referred to the ECJ by the Oberster Gerichtshof was (para. 15):

…whether Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that the condition that it must be ‘possible’, within the meaning of that provision, to commence proceedings to challenge the default judgment in respect of which enforcement is sought, requires that the judgment should have been duly served on the defendant, or whether it is sufficient that the latter should have become aware of its existence at the stage of the enforcement proceedings in the State in which enforcement is sought.

The ECJ answered the question in favour of the hypothetical defendant (para. 49):

In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred must be that Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to be interpreted as meaning that it is ‘possible’ for a defendant to bring proceedings to challenge a default judgment against him only if he was in fact acquainted with its contents, because it was served on him in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence before the courts of the State in which the judgment was given.

The full judgment can be found here. Comments welcome.

Update: There is a short case-note in the forthcoming edition of EU Focus (2007, 201, 8-9) on the decision in ASML.

Tiong Min Yeo (National University of Singapore) has posted “Natural Forum and the Elusive Significance of Jurisdiction Agreements” on SSRN. Here’s the abstract:

The Singapore court’s power to stay its proceedings by reason of its “not being the appropriate forum the proceedings ought not to be continued” is underpinned by the common law principle enunciated in The Spiliada that generally a trial should be heard in its natural forum, i.e., the forum best suited to try the case for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice. The approach in forum non conveniens is undisputed. A defendant who has been served with process within the jurisdiction seeking a stay of proceedings has to show that there is another available and competent forum which is clearly the more appropriate forum for the trial of the action. At this stage the court looks primarily to factors of convenience and expense and the connections of the parties and the issues in the case to determine the forum with which the action has the most real and substantial connection. If no clearly more appropriate forum is shown to exist, stay would ordinarily be refused. If there is such a forum, then the local proceedings will be stayed unless the circumstances show that the stay would deprive the plaintiff of substantial justice; the mere deprivation of the legitimate advantages of the plaintiff in having the trial in the forum is not decisive.

You can download the article from here.

To complete our round-up of newly available articles today, we have an article on “Warnings for a New Beginning” by William Tong (University of Nottingham), which explores the tort choice of law rules in Singapore, and how they compare with other common law jurisdictions such as the UK. Here’s the abstract:

In striking contrast with some of the Commonwealth developments in the area of tort choice of law, where notably even the United Kingdom has abandoned the English common law position in relation to tort choice of law for a statutory regime embodied by Part III of the Private International (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, Singapore has largely maintained its adherence to the English common law position with the unequivocal acceptance by the Singapore Court of Appeal that the “applicable choice of law rule in Singapore with respect to torts committed overseas is that laid down in Phillips v. Eyre” and that the “exception to the rule as formulated in Boys v. Chaplin, Johnson v. Coventry Churchill and Red Sea Insurance” is part of Singapore law as well.

Available to download from here.

A note written By Adrian Briggs (Univeristy of Oxford) has been made available for download on the SSRN network: “A Note on the Application of the Statute Law of Singapore within Its Private International Law” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 189-203, 2005. The abstract reads:

The purpose of this Note is to raise a question on which the rules of private international law of the common law, including Singapore, are less satisfactory than they should be. It is written in the light of one part of a seminar conducted at the Singapore Academy of Law in April 2005, but the proximate cause of the investigation was an enquiry as to the application of certain aspects of Singapore’s statutory employment law in cases in which the factual and legal context contains points of contact to countries outside Singapore, or to laws other than the law of Singapore. It is presented in the form of a Note because its aim is to raise the issue as one for thought and further analysis, rather than pretending to give answers which are, in the writer’s opinion, fixed and final. In the current state of the law’s development it is not possible to claim any more for any individual analysis.

You can find the article, for free as usual, here.

A highly theoretical, and interesting, article on the rules governing e-commerce transactions (or “cyberspace”, as the author puts it) has been posted on SSRN. David G. Post’s article, “Governing Cyberspace“, was originally in the Wayne Law Review, Vol. 43, p. 155, 1996. Here’s the abstract:

What is the source of those law(s) that will govern our interactions in cyberspace? What body of rules will participants in cyberspace transactions consult to determine their substantive obligations and who is to make those rules? This paper sketches out two alternative models for the way in which order can emerge in this environment, models I refer to as Hamilton and Jefferson. Hamilton involves an increasing degree of centralization of control, achieved by means of increasing international coordination among existing sovereigns, through multi-lateral treaties and/or the creation of new international governing bodies along the lines of the World Trade Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the like. Jefferson invokes a radical decentralization of law-making, the development of processes that do not impose order on the electronic world but through which order can emerge, in which individual network access providers, rather than territorially-based states, become the essential units of governance. The normative choice is a significant one, and I argue that mobility users’ ability to move unhindered into and out of individual networks with their distinct rule-sets is a powerful guarantee that the resulting distribution of rules is a just one; indeed, that our very conception of what constitutes justice may change as we observe the kind of law that emerges from uncoerced individual choice.

You can download the article from here.

There have been a couple of articles in various journals concerning the conflict of laws this month. Without further ado, they are:

1) E.C. Ritaine, "Harmonising European Private International Law: A Replay of Hannibal's Crossing of the Alps?" International Journal of Legal Information, Vol. 34, No. 2, (2006) pp. 419-439.

2) Nikiforos Sifakis, "Exclusive jurisdiction clauses – Article 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation – the ‘Italian torpedo’ – anti-suit injunctions" Journal of International Maritime Law, Issue 5, Vol. 12, (2006).

3) There's also a forthcoming article in the International Company and Commercial Law Review: P.J. Omar, "The extra-territorial reach of the European Insolvency Regulation" I.C.C.L.R. 2007, 18(2), 57-66. There's an abstract available for this article:

Assesses the extent to which the provisions of Council Regulation 1346/2000 may conflict with those of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency 1997 in the event of an international insolvency which crosses EC borders and how priorities might be determined by EC courts in such circumstances. Reviews the limits of the Regulation's application and case law on its potential effect on non EC debtors bound by the Model Law, including the circumstances in which a company incorporated elsewhere may be deemed to have its centre of main interests within the EC. Considers the international relevance of the Regulation and the position of groups of companies with some non EC members.

Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays to you all.

As part of LexisNexis Canada's new resource collection, Halsbury's Laws of Canada, Janet Walker of Osgoode Hall Law School has authored the volume on Conflict of Laws.  Professor Walker is the author of Castel & Walker, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 6th edition, from the same publisher, which is Canada's leading text in the field.  This new work features enhanced finding aids, a glossary of key terms, and listings of relevant secondary sources for further research.  More information available here from the publisher.

The 2006 special edition of the Collected Papers of Zagreb Law Faculty, which is dedicated to the 70^th birthday of professor at the University of Zagreb Faculty of Law and member of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences Jakša Barbić, captures also the attention of the conflict lawyers, particularly due to three articles appearing there.

An article by professor emeritus Krešimir Sajko deals with the issues of contract conflict of laws de lege lata and de lege ferenda. The author compares the rules of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to international contractual obligation to the rules contained in the Proposal on the Rome I Regulation. Further comparison is made to the present Croatian rules in the field and the ones put forward by the group of Zagreb scholars. Professor Sajko concludes its paper by saying that, although there is no Croatian obligation to harmonize its conflict of law with the European rules, these rules should be adopted before Croatia becomes a Member State.

Another paper, written by professor Hrvoje Sikirić, also covers contract conflict of laws but focuses specifically to the questions arising out of e-commerce. The central part of the article is dedicated to comparative analysis of the European and Croatian rules determining the law applicable to contracts negotiated, concluded and/or performed by electronic means. The conclusion defended here is that technical aspects of electronic commerce do not have sufficient bearing on the conflict principles to trigger the change in the subsidiary connecting factor that is applicable also in the non-electronic environment. In other words, the law of the country where the service provider (the party performing the characteristic obligation) is located should regulate the electronic aspects of the contract.

The third article relevant for this report is concerned with the freedom of movement of companies under the acquis rules. The author, docent Davor Babić, attempts to answer the question whether the mobility of the companies in the EU enables the regulatory competition among Member States. With that goal in mind, the author first examines the rules of the Community primary legal sources on the freedom of establishment. Further discussed is the ECJ practice in regard to the freedom to choose the applicable company law when establishing a company and afterwards, when the company is already established, as well as its limitations in the national laws.

Initial reports this morning suggested that the European Parliament Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) had adopted the second reading report (as amended) of the proposed “Rome II” Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, and this has subsequently been confirmed on the MEP Rapporteur’s website. Diana Wallis states:

On Wednesday 20 December 2006, the Legal Affairs Committee adopted the second reading report, reinserting the Articles relating to defamation and road traffic accidents which had been excluded in the Council Common Position. The report will be adopted in plenary session on 18 January 2006.

The original draft second report of the European Parliament was produced on 8th November 2006 (see our news item on the substance of the report here), with the amendments to the draft report being published on 30th Novmber 2006.

Once the report has been adopted by the European Parliament, the likelihood is that the conciliation phase of the codecision procedure will go ahead (on the basis that the Council will not be best pleased with the reappearance of provisions that they rejected on first reading, and several new amendments put forth by JURI.) Twenty-five members of the Council and an equal number of EP representatives will have to sit down and, over a period of 6 to 8 weeks, devise a “joint text” on Rome II. If they fail, or the joint text is not approved by Parliament or Council, then Rome II will not make it any further. Details on the conciliation phase can be found here.

(Many thanks to Andrew Dickinson for the tip-off.)

December 2006 has seen a wealth of activity in the U.S. federal courts on topics of particular interest to private international practitioners. This month’s U.S. round-up will divide the pertinent and most interesting cases into four primary subject-matter areas: (1) Choice of law; (2) Personal Jurisdiction; (3) International Discovery; and (4) Foreign Sovereign Immunity. Part I here will focus only on the first two issues, with Part II to follow within the next few days.

(1) Choice of Law

K.T. v. Dash, 2006 WL 3627688, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 14, 2006)

In this tort case, Plaintiff and Defendant, both New York residents, were on holiday in Brazil. Plaintiff alleged that she was raped by Defendant, and Defendant moved for dismissal on forum non conveniens ("FNC"), or in the alternative, the determination that Brazilian law applies to the suit. The appellate court first affirmed the trial court's denial of FNC dismissal, concluding that both parties reside in NY, many witnesses are also NY residents, and there is little burden on NY courts. Therefore, even though the events occurred in Brazil, NY is still a proper forum.

Turning to choice of law, the court first decided whether there is an actual conflict between Brazilian and NY law. To show actual conflict, defense counsel submitted an affidavit from a Brazilian lawyer claiming the elements of proving sexual assault in Brazil are much greater than those in New York. Because the affidavits were unclear and general, the court determined that defendants have not proven that an actual conflict exists.

The court nonetheless held that New York law is applicable even were a conflict to exist. Based on an interests analysis, the court held that New York is the forum with the greatest interests in both parties. Because both Defendant and Plaintiff only spent a few days while on vacation in Brazil, Brazil has little to no interest in applying its law for the suit.

The court concluded with this well reasoned discussion of the choice of law question in tort cases:

[I]t is useful in our analysis to consider whether the application of the law of Brazil would thwart or threaten an important policy underlying New York's law, or, on the other hand, whether the application of New York law would frustrate any policies underlying Brazil's applicable rule of law. Defendant emphasizes that Brazil has a sovereign interest in regulating conduct within its borders, [but] the present litigation provides no proposed protection of anyone in Brazil, and, indeed, the outcome of the litigation will have no impact at all on Brazil or any of its citizens or residents. Brazil's interest in ensuring that citizens and non-citizens damaged by tortious conduct within its borders have the right to seek compensation from the tortfeasor, is in no way damaged by application of New York law in the present case. In addition, while enforcement of its rules regarding misconduct within its borders could generally be said to serve as a deterrent against future tortious conduct, the possibility of such a deterrent effect being felt in Brazil is minimal where the interaction was entirely between New Yorkers, and the matter is being addressed in a New York court. In contrast, . . . [the] application of Brazil's rule[s] could thwart New York's strong interest in providing recompense for its residents who have been injured by a sexual assault, especially if it was perpetrated by another New Yorker. So, even if the purpose of the Brazilian rule of law were said to be primarily conduct-regulating, in this context the general rule that "the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply" (see Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 72) should not be applied. . . .We therefore conclude that New York law must govern this action, notwithstanding the occurrence of the alleged tort in Brazil and the conduct-regulating aspects of the competing rules.

As the International Civil Litigation Blog astutely points out, this is a potentially important case giving international effect to cornerstone NY choice of law cases like Babcock and Schultz, and applying an interest analysis rather than a strict lex loci delicti.

The tort aspect of choice of law rules in K.T. must be read alongside a recent decision by the same court in a contract case. In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2006), the question presented was whether New York or New Jersey law governed a large number of excess liability insurance policies for asbestos-related claims. Supplanting a mere "grouping of contracts" approach for a "governmental interest analysis," the court held that "where it is necessary to determine the law governing a liability insurance policy covering risks in multiple states, the state of the insured domicile should be regarded as the proxy for the principal location of the insured risk. As such, the state of the domicile [at the time the policy was issued] is the source of applicable law."

(2) Personal Jurisdiction

Amirhour v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 2006 WL 3499241 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4 2006)

This is a tort claim arising from a California resident's stay at a French Marriott. The chair attached to the wall of the shower collapsed, causing the plaintiff to fracture her pelvis. As is fairly typical in international litigation, plaintiffs brought suit at home in California rather than in France. The French defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and all defendants sought dismissal on forum non conveniens.

The court first rejected plaintiffs' claim for general jurisdiction over the MVCI Holidays France by holding that Marriott Ownership Resorts, the U.S. based defendant, did not act as general agents for the foreign defendant. Turning to specific jurisdiction, the court held that MVCI Holidays France had not "directed activity at California which would have invoked the benefits and protections of the laws of California." Newsletters and payment reminders sent to plaintiff in California where insufficient. Those newsletters and notices were only sent after Plaintiff voluntarily contracted with Marriott Ownership Resorts and expressly agreed that they could send her such notices. Accordingly, the court dismissed MVCI Holidays France for a lack of personal jurisdiction.

Marriott International, Inc., a U.S. based corporation, sought dismissal of the entire suit through forum non conveniens. The defendant contended "that this action bears no relationship to California, arose out of activity occurring in France, and will involve the application of French civil law." Analyzing the Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert factors, the court concluded that both the private and public interest factors weigh in favor of keeping the suit in California. Plaintiffs limited resources and inability to successfully maintain a case in France was the decisive private factor. Further, the court held that California has an interest in the protection of its citizens. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss for FNC.

Again, the authors at the International Civil Litigation Blog point out an interesting twist.  The court acknowledged that it deviated from the general Ninth Circuit rule requiring a trial court to make a choice of law determination prior to deciding FNC. Pereira v. Utah Transp., Inc., 764 F.2d 686, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1985). Although defendants alleged throughout their papers that French substantive law would apply, they did not submit any evidence in support of this contention, foreclosing the Court from making a choice of law determination. Nevertheless, even if French law applies were to apply this case, the court noted that it would still deny defendants motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Tuazon, Nilo D., No. 05-1525 (U.S.)

In another interesting development — or non-development — coming from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court this month denied certiorari over Reynolds' attempt to clarify and limit the application of general jurisdiction for torts ocurring abroad.  Plaintiff Tuazon, a long-time resident and citizen of the Phillipines, asserted claims against the tobacco company in the State of Washington for injuries he sustained from smoking in his home country.  Reynolds, a North Carolina corporation, moved to dismiss the suit on jurisdictional grounds.  The Ninth Circuit held that, because Reynolds sold a substantial amount of cigarettes in Washington, alongside other activities aimed at marketing those sales, the court could exercise general (or "doing business") jurisdiction over the company there, even though its place of incorporation and principal place of business was in North Carolina and the cause of action arose abroad.  See 433 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006). Lawyers for the company argued to the Court that, under the holding of the Ninth Circuit (as well as those of the Second, Sixth, Eighth and Federal circuits), which simply weighed the "confluence" of commercial contacts with the state to find minimum contacts, large companies like Reynolds who sell products in every jurisdiction can be de facto subject to suit on any cause of action in any state.  They also pointed out that the federal courts of appeals have become widely split on the manner of assessing contacts for general jurisdiction – with the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits taking a qualitative rather than quantitative approach to the minimum contacts analysis for general jurisdiction — and asked the Court to accept the case and clarify the matter.  The Supreme Court has upheld the assertion of general jurisdiction only once in the modern era (see Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)), and spoken to the issue last in 1984 (See Helicopteros v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)).  Though initially signalling interest in the case (by ordering a Brief in Opposition from the Respondent in September), the Court eventually denied certiorari on December 4.  American law of general jurisdiction will have to wait even longer for a long-awaited clarification from the Court.

Several news sources picked-up on this cert denial, including CNN, and the SCOTUSBlog.  The order of the Court can be found here.

(Disclaimer: Charles Kotuby is an attorney with Jones Day, who represented Petitioner in this matter)

This is a final reminder that the deadline for submission of an abstract of a proposed paper, to present at the Journal of Private International Law Conference 2007, is 20th December 2006, at 6pm.

Update: the deadline has now passed. Many thanks for all the submissions.

Vacancies for speaking at the conference cannot be guaranteed after the deadline, so we would urge all those who wish to present a paper to submit their abstract by 6pm on 20th December 2006. The abstract should be between 200-300 words.

You can find details on submitting the abstract of your proposed paper here.

An article by Giesela Rühl (Hamburg) on the provision concerning consumer contracts in the Rome I proposal has been published in the European Community Private Law Review (GPR) 2006, 196 et seq. The English summary reads as follows:

In December 2005 the European Commission has released the Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations. One of the most important changes relates to the scope of application of Article 5, which is characterized by the introduction of the targeted activity criterion embodied in Article 15 (1) lit. c) of the Brussels I Regulation and a safeguard clause for the protection of professionals. At first blush this combination - that is new to European private international law - seems to make sense. However, a closer examination reveals that the safeguard clause does not have an independent scope of application if it is combined with the targeted activity criterion. Since it merely complicates the provision of Article 5 (2) it should be deleted.

The 6th edition of the German standard work on private international law, "Internationales Privatrecht" by Jan Kropholler (Hamburg), has been published.

The main part of the book is dedicated to choice of law. Here Kropholler describes in a first chapter the basic ideas of the conflict of laws, such as its history, the structure of choice of law rules, basic concepts as qualification, connecting factor and public policy before attending in the second chapter to the individual fields of private international law such as legal transactions, family law, the law of contract, non-contractual obligations, the law of property and company law. In the last chapter, Kropholler addresses the fundamentals of international civil procedure law. While Kropholler focuses on German national rules he includes also international conventions as well as European legal instruments. 

An annotation to Opinion 1/03, where the European Court of Justice has held that "the conclusion of the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (…) falls entirely within the sphere of exclusive competence of the European Community", by Ulrich G. Schroeter (Freiburg) has been published in the European Community Private Law Review (GPR) 2006, 203 et seq. The English summary reads as follows:

In its recent Opinion 1/03, the European Court of Justice ruled on the question of the competence of the European Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and found that the EC possesses an implicit exclusive competence to conclude the new Convention. The present case note criticizes the reasoning of the ECJ and inter alia argues that the Court (1) has failed to demonstrate that the existing Brussels I-Regulation would be affected by the new Lugano Convention, (2) should have scrutinized the EC's internal competence to regulate relations with non-member countries, and (3) has in fact misunderstood the legal relevance of "disconnection clauses". 

See regarding this question our older post, which can be found here.

Richard D. Freer (Emory University) has posted “Reviewing Domestic and Global Choice of Forum Doctrine through a Single Case” on SSRN. Here’s the abstract:

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno is the Supreme Court’s leading case on forum non conveniens - that is, on when a federal court should dismiss a pending case in favor of litigation in a foreign forum. Every casebook features the case and every civil procedure professor has taught it. The greatest value of Piper, however, is not its discussion of forum non conveniens, but its fact pattern, which provides an unparalleled vehicle for reviewing a startling number of doctrines pertaining to domestic forum selection, including personal jurisdiction under the stream-of-commerce theory, subject matter jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship and alienage, venue, transfer of venue, choice-of-law, as well as statutory interpretation. In addition, its treatment of forum non conveniens raises profound questions about the role of American courts in global perspective. Piper thus accomplishes more than any other single case in the civil procedure course, while emphasizing the importance of forum selection; where litigation proceeds is an issue of surpassing importance, on which litigants will expend great resources.

You can download the full article here.

As recently covered by the Financial Times, and forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Economics, a new study details an unsurprising yet still unsettling fact when it is substantiated: foreign litigants lose more in U.S. Courts.  Here is the abstract:

Using a comprehensive sample of 2,361 public U.S. corporate defendants and 715 public foreign corporate defendants in U.S. federal courts in the period 1995-2000, we find that the market reaction at the announcement of a U.S. federal lawsuit is less negative for U.S. corporate defendants. We find that this market reaction is rational; U.S. firms are less likely to lose than foreign firms controlling for year, industry, type of litigation, size and profitability. This may still reflect a sample selection bias. We control for this bias, and the results remain. We thus cannot rule out that U.S. firms have a home court advantage in U.S. federal courts.

Opinio Juris notes that perhaps the most interesting claim is that judges may be more biased than juries are. As this sort of evidence mounts, I assume it will incrementally bolster the legitimacy of supranational and arbitral fora for dispute resolution.

The full study can be found here.

Professor Kurt Lipstein, one of the greatest comparative lawyers of the twentieth century, passed away at 11:15pm on Saturday 2nd December 2006. His wife Gwyneth predeceased him in 1998 and he is survived by two daughters, Eve and Diana. Happily he was active to the very end of his life, and attended his last public function in the Law Faculty (20th November) on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of obtaining his PhD. In September 2006, Cambridge University compiled an account of his extraordinary career:

Kurt Lipstein was born in Frankfurt am Main, Germany on 19th March 1909. His father was from Königsberg in East Prussia (now Russia) and his mother from Frankfurt. He had an English great-grandfather, and his grandmother had grown up in England. This explained the relative ease with which Kurt eventually settled into England. After his schooling at the Goethe Gymnasium in Frankfurt, Kurt studied law at the University of Grenoble (1927) and Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin (1927-31). Here, he rubbed shoulders (metaphorically if not actually) with professors such as Wolff and Rabels, and younger colleagues including von Caemmerer, and Mezger. His classical education in Greek and Latin allowed him later to have clear insights into the inner workings of Roman Law - these days something of a lost art.

Once graduated, his practical legal training began in 1931 as Referendar in Königstein and then at the district of Court of Appeal of Frankfurt, but with the election of the National Socialists to power, his career effectively collapsed. In April 1933 employment in the civil service was barred to Jewish professionals, and in 1934 Kurt emigrated to England to escape persecution. He obtained a place at Trinity College to study for his PhD, which was on the subject of suretyship within Roman Law: the beneficium cedendarum actionum. This was successfully defended in 1936 before Martin Wolff’s brother-in-law, H. F. Jolowicz, who was then Professor of Roman Law at the University of London.

At that point, financial matters reared their head. He was unsuccessful in applying for a scholarship at Trinity, was unwilling to become a burden on the English branch of his extended family. His savior, and his mentor was Harold Gutteridge, the Professor of Comparative Law, who, in 1937, began to pay Kurt from his own pocket to give “supervisions” in Roman Law, Public International Law and Constitutional Law.

Soon after the Second World War broke out (1940) Kurt was interned as an enemy alien and sent to camps at Bury St Edmunds and then Liverpool. Here he met an eclectic mix of academics and professionals, many of whom later went on to either high office or academic status (or both). He mentions some of these in the interviews that are archived elsewhere on this site (as a transcript published by the IJLI, and the original audio version). Luckily the university secured his release later in the year, and he returned to Cambridge where he was given membership of Clare College, with which he has been associated ever since. He became a fellow in 1956. In 2002, fellow legal academics at the college (Moore & Turpin, 2002) conducted an interview with Kurt to reminisce on his associations therewith.

The Faculty Board employed Kurt as Faculty Secretary for a small stipend, and in 1944 he married Gwyneth Herford. After the war, in 1946, he was appointed to one of a batch of new lectureships (which included David Daube, Trevor Thomas and R. Y. Jennings), and he remained in this post until 1962, when he was appointed Reader in Conflict of Laws. In 1973 Kurt became Professor of Comparative Law, following in the footsteps of his erstwhile friend and patron Harold Gutteridge, of whom he reminisces affectionately in our interviews. In 1977 the University awarded him his LLD.

Kurt Lipstein formally retired in 1977, but to this day (Michaelmas Term 2006, in his 98th year) he has continued to give supervisions with great enthusiasm and charisma to students at Clare College, and has remained academically active and scholastically productive. He also lectures at the annual Summer School in English Legal Methods offered by the Faculty of Law. His success with the students is grounded in his legal knowledge, but there is no doubt that his charm and sense of humour have much to do with his popularity.

Kurt Lipstein has an unparalleled association with the Squire Law Library, having occupied offices and worked as a scholar in each of its manifestations: Downing Street (1934-37), The Old Schools (1937-1995), and now the glass and concrete titanic West Road site (1995-). This is a unique achievement, and exploring his memories of its personalities and how the library developed over those 72 years, forms the core of the interviews we conducted with Kurt in 2004. Remember, the Squire Law Library is only four years older than Kurt and it is fascinating to hear how relatively small and parochial the collections appear to have been in those early years.

Kurt has a long publications record, but many of his writings are in Festschriften and similar works that are not readily available in our digitised age: 14 from his total of 118 publications, and readers might find some of his publications difficult to lay their hands on. In the bibliography, we have listed all those for which we can account.

Although his earliest works dealt with Roman Law, Kurt’s reputation and later career rest largely on his studies on the conflict of laws within international law (both public and private), and his views (with Gutteridge) have strongly influenced the coverage of the subject in Dicey & Morris’s Conflict of Laws (Forsyth 2004). An important development in broadening his horizons on the reception of western law into jurisdictions with different cultures, was his appointment as Directeur des Recherches of the International Association of Legal Science for the period 1954-59. The results of this are apparent in the five publications Kurt produced on the legal regimes in Turkey and India.

During our interviews, it was clear that Kurt was particularly sensible (the word proud would be an unworthy epithet for such a self-effacing man) of the honour accorded him on his invitation to give The Hague lectures in 1972 (and which he published separately in 1976). When he was asked for the highlights of his career at the end of the interviews, he replied; the achievement of an academic career, the title of Queen’s Counsel, and his membership of the Institute of International Law.

His academic career has been long and fruitful, and its legacy is bound to be felt for the foreseeable future. As for the others, Kurt was called to the Bar (Middle Temple) in 1950, and in 1993 he was elected to the Institut de Droit International. The Institut then gave him the task of preparing a Resolution on a theme of “Taking foreign private international [law] into consideration”. This was a taxing remit: under the heading “Renvoi” it had twice previously come before the Institut for resolution (1896-1900 & 1957-1965), with inconclusive results. Kurt Lipstein tackled it with his usual foresight, and when he reported (in 1998), as he modesty put it, his new “Resolution was accepted with few modifications” (Lipstein 2004 p. 769). The question of his success, where others had failed, was raised during our interviews (question 73), and his reply is a model of understatement.

His final highlight was achieved when he was made an Honorary Queen’s Counsel in 1998. Kurt was an Honorary Fellow of Wolfson College, and still lives in the secluded house in Newnham he built in 1947-8 and shared with Clive Parry, and their respective families.

Finally, it is clear from the last paragraph of his own reminiscences of his time at Cambridge, that Kurt Lipstein feels he owes a debt of gratitude to the institution that gave him the chance to make a new life when the land of his birth was no longer welcoming (Lipstein 2004). This has manifest itself in a lifetime devoted to upholding its values and faithfully following a path of true scholarship.

A bibiography of all of Professor Lipstein's published works can be found here, and you can also look through an archive of photos charting Professor Lipstein's life. A series of interviews with the man himself can be downloaded from here, and you can leave your thoughts and condolences on the comments board on the Cambridge website. Our thoughts are with his family, as I'm sure are all those who have felt the influence of Professor Lipstein's unparalleled scholarship in the field over the last seventy years.

Georg Philip Krog (Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law) has posted a short article on SSRN entitled, “Determinants for Dataflow: Norm and Action - Causation in Law, and Causation from Law to Action”. Here's the abstract:

The paper explores succinctly two questions in abbreviated form: First, how may law, elucidated by the rules of international adjudicatory authority, be a determinant for cross-border circulation of intangible data and communicational behaviour in global computer networks? Second, why are rules on international adjudicatory authority the starting point for such a determination?

The full article is available here.

Reid Mortensen (TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland) has published a new text on Private International Law in Australia. Here’s the publisher’s summary:

Private International Law in Australia is a substantial new text, providing comprehensive coverage by an internationally respected expert author in this area of law. The standard range of topics is covered in suitable detail for LLB students. The book includes important recent developments in private international law. Examination of the decision in Renault v Zhang (2002) and other recent developments will make this the most current, accurate text covering the private international law of tort, a major part of the field for practitioners and students. Summary of contents:

• Introduction to Private International Law
• Jurisdiction and Judgments
• Choice of Law
• International Family Law
• Choice of Obligations Law
• Choice of Property Law

ISBN: 9780409322446. Price: $95.00 (Australian dollars). Available from LexisNexis Australia.